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Abstract— The frequency stability of power systems is in-
creasingly challenged by various types of disturbances. In
particular, the increasing penetration of renewable energy
sources is increasing the variability of power generation and
at the same time reducing system inertia against disturbances.
In this paper we are particularly interested in understanding
how rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) violations could arise
from unusually large power disturbances.
We devise a novel specialization, named ghost sampling, of the
Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo method that is
tailored to efficiently sample rare power disturbances leading to
nodal frequency violations. Generating a representative random
sample addresses important statistical questions such as “which
generator is most likely to be disconnected due to a RoCoF
violation?” or “what is the probability of having simultaneous
RoCoF violations, given that a violation occurs?” Our method
can perform conditional sampling from any joint distribution of
power disturbances including, for instance, correlated and non-
Gaussian disturbances, features which have both been recently
shown to be significant in security analyses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency stability is a prime concern of transmission
system operators, as frequencies instabilities may lead to
machines desynchronization and trigger large power out-
ages [ADF+05]. Transmission systems are experiencing in-
creased stress and approaching their stability limits due, for
example, to the continued connection of power electronics,
increased uncertainty, cross-border power flows and the addi-
tion of high-voltage direct current (HVDC) links [WEBK15].
In particular, system inertia is decreasing as synchronous
machines are replaced by inverter-connected distributed gen-
eration. Low inertia levels, together with the variability of
renewable generation, can lead to large swings in the power
system frequency [UBA14]. While promising mitigations ex-
ist including participation from loads [ZTLL14], [VPMB16],
distributed energy resources [GZD+17] and virtual iner-
tia [PBD17], it is increasingly important to also understand
the stability of power system frequency under random distur-
bances to the network’s power injections. In the Irish trans-
mission system, for example, the rate of change of frequency
(RoCoF) has been identified as the key limit to allowing high
real-time penetrations of wind generation [CMSR13]. Further
it has been shown that frequency fluctuations have a heavy-
tailed distribution [SBA+18], making strong deviations more
likely than would be expected under, for example, a Gaussian
model of fluctuations. Beyond questions of system stability
it has also been shown that stochastic disturbances can cause
significant resistive power losses to be incurred in stabilising
the system frequency [TBG15].
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In this paper we aim to investigate the extent to which
infrequently observed, but large, disturbances to nodal power
injections can cause an unexpected rate of change in the
power system frequency. In particular, following a distur-
bance to one or more nodal power injections we model
the rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) over the primary
control timescale. Motivated by stability considerations for
RoCoF relays, we develop a simulation technique to inves-
tigate possible causes of RoCoF violations. The frequency
considered is either the system average frequency or the
set of nodal frequencies, and different characterizations of
RoCoF violations are explored.
Estimating the probability of rare events in power systems
is computationally challenging. Recent work in this area
includes [OM17], [NZZ17a], [NZZ17b] and the present
paper is complementary to such studies. Instead we aim
to generate a representative sample of disturbances, con-
ditional on a RoCoF violation occurring. To this end we
present ghost sampling, a specialization of the Metropolis-
Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
Relative to current probabilistic power system reliability
analyses, a key advantage of MCMC is to allow the power
disturbances to have arbitrary joint distribution. Whereas
independent disturbances have always been assumed so far
in the literature (see [PM17]), the use of MCMC allows the
disturbance magnitudes to have both correlation and arbitrary
marginal probability distributions. Simultaneous nodal power
disturbances with a common cause, due for example to line
failures or large weather fronts, may thus be modelled in this
framework.
The low probability of RoCoF violations is, however,
a challenge to the standard Metropolis-Hastings MCMC
algorithm. In common with many other sampling techniques,
the latter approach may result in a large part of compu-
tational effort being expended in proposing non-violating
states. Further, when a violating state is sampled, standard
MCMC chains risk becoming ‘stuck’ in its vicinity (see
Section 1.11.2 of [BGJM11]). The ‘ghost proposal’ described
below mitigates these issues by proposing only violating
states.
In the nodal analysis we derive expressions for the full set
of RoCoFs at time t ≥ 0. We also obtain expressions for
the set of disturbances whose maximum RoCoF exceeds a
given acceptable threshold, which may vary per node. From
the representative sample generated we are able to estimate
quantities of interest conditional on a violation, in contrast
with the average-case analyses common in the literature, see
e.g., [PM17], [TBG15].
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A power system described by the graph G = (G, E)
is considered, with nodes (buses) G = {1, . . . , n} and
m edges (transmission lines) E ⊆ G × G. It is assumed
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that G is a reduced network in which each bus houses a
generation unit, since passive loads can be eliminated via
Kron reduction [DB13], [DB10].
Writing ωj for the frequency at node j ∈ G, the time
evolution of nodal frequencies is modelled via linearized
dynamics as
Mjω˙j +Dj ωj = p
in
j − poutj , ∀ j ∈ G, (1)
where Mj > 0 is the inertia of the generator at node j ∈ G,
Dj > 0 is the damping/droop control coefficient, and pinj and
poutj represent, respectively, the mechanical power injected
by the generator at node j and the net electrical power drawn
by the network from node j; see [Kun94] for more details.
Reactive power injections and reactive power flows are
neglected and the standard assumptions of lossless lines,
time-invariant identical voltage magnitudes across all nodes
and small-signal approximations [PMVB05], [WWS14] are
made. In view of these assumptions, the so-called DC power
flow approximation holds, namely
poutj =
∑
i∈G
fi,j =
∑
i∈G
Bi,j(θi − θj), (2)
where fi,j describes the power flow on line e = (i, j) ∈ E ,
Be = Bi,j ≥ 0 is the (effective) susceptance between nodes
i and j and θj denotes the phase angle at node j ∈ G. Note
that an arbitrary but fixed orientation has been chosen for
the edges in E , which is captured by the incidence matrix
C ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×m of G, that is
Ci,e =

1 if e = (i, j),
−1 if e = (j, i),
0 otherwise.
Denoting by B ∈ Rm×m the diagonal matrix with the
susceptances {Be}e=1,...,m as diagonal entries, the relation
between line flows and phase angles may be rewritten in
matrix form as
f = BCT θ,
where f ∈ Rm and θ ∈ Rn are the vectors of line flows and
phase angles, respectively.
We are interested in how, starting from an equilibrium
point, the network reacts to a vector u ∈ Rn of nodal power
disturbances. In view of (1) and (2), the deviations from their
nominal values of the nodal frequencies and line power flows
are then described by
Mjω˙j = −Dj ωj + uj −
∑
i : (i,j)∈E
fi,j , ∀ j ∈ G, (3a)
f˙i,j = Bi,j(ωi − ωj), ∀ (i, j) ∈ E , (3b)
where, with a minor abuse of notation, the variables ω
and f henceforth denote deviations from the corresponding
nominal values at equilibrium. This means, in particular, that
at equilibrium all variables in equations (3) are equal to 0.
The entries uj , j ∈ G of the random disturbance vector
u ∈ Rn are modelled as continuous random variables
with joint probability density function pi, so that for any
measurable subset A ⊆ Rn we have
P[u ∈ A] =
∫
A
pi(u1, . . . un) du1 . . . dun. (4)
The correlation in renewable generation, alongside corre-
lation in other factors such as loads, has been shown
to have a significant effect on power system risk assess-
ment [LZW+15]. One advantage of our approach is that the
random disturbances uj are not required to be independent.
This is because we aim to simulate typical disturbances u
causing frequency violations rather than, for example, to
derive closed form expressions for synchronization perfor-
mance as in [PM17] or [TBG15].
Further, the errors in renewable power forecasts have
been shown to have significantly non-Gaussian distributions.
For example, fat tails have been demonstrated in wind
power forecast errors [BDNL08]. This is another advantage
of our conditional simulation procedure, since the random
disturbances can have a general joint probability density.
To illustrate this point the case study presented later in
Section VI uses a mixture of uncorrelated Gaussian and
correlated, fat tailed non-Gaussian distributions.
The uj are modelled as step disturbances, namely
u(t) = u1{t≥0}.
Thus time t = 0 is the moment just after the random
disturbance(s). The desynchronization effect of u on the
frequencies at all nodes j ∈ G will be modelled from time
t = 0 until time t =  > 0. This step model is valid when
the disturbances represented by the uj can be reasonably
approximated as constant over the time interval [0, ]. (In
the case study below we take  = 0.5s.)
Our method in the remainder of the paper has two parts,
as follows:
1) characterise the ‘safe region’ K ⊂ Rn of disturbances
u ∈ Rn which do not give rise to frequency violations;
2) generate a statistically representative sample from its
complement Kc.
Frequency violations will be characterised using the Ro-
CoF, by which we mean |ω˙|, the magnitude of the rate
of change of frequency. The analysis begins with the rate
of change of the system frequency, before moving to the
consideration of nodal frequencies. The latter context is
particularly pertinent when nodal frequencies are considered,
since generating machines are protected by RoCoF-sensitive
relays which observe only the local nodal frequency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section III
we introduce step 1) in the simpler context of analysing
the system frequency. In Section IV the nodal frequency
dynamics are first established, and the step 1) is then carried
out in this context. Step 2) is developed in Section V, and
an illustrative case study for our analysis is provided in
Section VI.
III. SYSTEM FREQUENCY
The system frequency or center of inertia (COI) is defined
as (see, for example, [UBA14]):
ω¯(t) :=
∑
i∈GMi ωi(t)∑
i∈GMi
.
This model has been studied in [PM17] under the simplifying
condition that there exist rating parameters f1, . . . , fn >
0 with maxi fi = 1 such that the inertia and damping
coefficients of generator i are given respectively by
Mi = fiM and Di = fiD, i ∈ G, (5)
where M and D are those of the machine j such that fj = 1.
In particular, it is shown in the latter paper (cf. Eq.(18)) that
the following holds under condition (5):
ω¯(t) = g(t)
∑
i
ui, t > 0, (6)
where g(t) := (
∑
iDi)
−1 (
1− e−(D/M)t).
The swing and network dynamics in (3a)-(3b) can be en-
riched to incorporate the turbine control dynamics, yielding
the following third-order model
ω˙j = − 1
Mj
(
Dj ωj − qj − uj +
∑
i : (i,j)∈E
fi,j
)
(7a)
qj = −1
τ
(R−1j ωj + qj) (7b)
where qj is the (variation of) turbine power, Rj the droop
coefficient, and τ is the turbine time constant (which is
uniform across different generators). If in addition to (5)
we further assume that R−1j = fjR
−1 for every j ∈ G
and that the system is under-damped, i.e., ω2d :=
D+R−1
Mτ −
1
4
(
1
τ +
D
M
)2
> 0, the system frequency still obeys an
equation of the same form as (6), where the function g(t) is
now a more involved function, namely
g(t) :=
1− e−ηt(cos(ωdt)− γ−ηωd sin(ωdt))
(
∑
iDi +R
−1
i )(D +R
−1)
,
where η := 12
(
1
τ +
D
M
)
and γ :=
(
1
τ − R
−1
M
)
.
From both models, with or without turbine control, it is
proved in [PM17] that the maximum RoCoF occurs at time
t ↓ 0+ and is equal to
max
t>0
∣∣∣∣ ddtω(t)
∣∣∣∣ = limt→0+
∣∣∣∣ ddt ω¯(t)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑
i∈G
ui
∣∣∣ |g˙(0)| .
Hence, for both dynamics, with or without turbine control,
the set of disturbances u ∈ Rn whose maximum induced
RoCoF does not exceed a predetermined threshold rmax is
simply
KMS =
{
u ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣∑
i
ui
∣∣∣ ≤ rmax|g˙(0)|
}
.
The region KMS is a convex polytope in Rn – that is,
the intersection of a number of half-spaces, which is not
necessarily bounded. (Here the subscript M refers to the
Maximum RoCoF metric and S to the System frequency).
The metric of average absolute RoCoF may alternatively
be considered. Over the time interval of length  following
the disturbance u this is given by Ω(), where
Ω() :=
1

∫ 
0
| ˙¯ω(t)|dt = 1

∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
ui
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 
0
|g˙(t)|dt. (8)
The set of disturbances whose average induced RoCoF over
t ∈ [0, ] does not exceed the threshold rmax is thus
KAS =
{
u ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣∑
i
ui
∣∣∣ ≤  rmax∫ 
0
|g˙(t)|dt
}
.
Since the turning points of g can be calculated analytically
for both models, the evaluation of the integral is straightfor-
ward. The set KAS of disturbances is also a convex polytope.
In summary, the ‘safe region’ of disturbances u ∈ Rn
inducing a rate of change in the system frequency less than
a threshold r is a convex polytope, for either the maximum or
average absolute RoCoF metric, and with or without turbine
control. In the next section we are able to establish a similar
result for the set of nodal frequencies under swing dynamics.
(a) Time evolution over the first 2s of the nodal frequency deviations
ω1(t), ω2(t), and ω3(t) and the system frequency ω¯(t) (Hz) in the
case study of Section VI after a random disturbance.
(b) Corresponding evolution over the first 2s of frequency speed
deviations ω˙1(t), ω˙2(t), ω˙3(t), and ˙¯ω(t) (Hz/s) for the same random
disturbance as in Fig. 1(a). The dashed horizontal lines represent the
RoCoF threshold rmax = 1Hz/s.
Fig. 1: Post-disturbance traces of some nodal frequencies for
the case study about the IEEE 39 New England interconnec-
tion system presented of Section VI.
IV. ROCOF VIOLATIONS FOR NODAL FREQUENCIES
While the system frequency is of inherent interest, it
cannot capture de-synchronization within the system. To
illustrate this point, Fig. 1 plots three nodal frequency traces
together with the system frequency following a random
disturbance. These traces are simulated from the system
described in the case study of Section VI. It is clear from
the figure that, under either the maximum or average ab-
solute RoCoF metric, it is possible for a given threshold
to be simultaneously respected by the system frequency
and violated by one or more nodal frequencies. Further,
as mentioned above, from the practical perspective it is
nodal frequencies which trigger the operation of RoCoF-
sensitive generator protection relays which can, in turn, lead
to significantly more serious frequency violations. The main
aim of this paper is therefore sampling the typical causes
of nodal frequency violations, and we focus on this from
now on. We remark that the generator inertia and damping
coefficients Mi and Di respectively may be arbitrary, so that
our setting is more general than that presented in Section III
(cf. condition (5)).
Let M ∈ Rn×n and D ∈ Rn×n be the diagonal ma-
trices containing the generator inertias and damping factors
respectively, and u ∈ Rn the random vector of disturbances.
Together with the notation from the previous section, the
swing equations (3a) and (3b) read[
ω˙
f˙
]
=
[−M−1D −M−1C
BCT O
]
·
[
ω
f
]
+
[
M−1
0
]
u,[
ω(0)
f(0)
]
=
[
0
0
]
.
By differentiation we obtain
ω¨ = −M−1D ω˙ −M−1CBCT ω
= −M−1D ω˙ −M−1Lω,
ω˙(0) = M−1u,
where L := CBCT is the weighted Laplacian matrix of
the graph G. Ignoring the line flows, we thus obtain a
homogeneous dynamical system of the form x˙ = Ax, with
x =
[
ω˙
ω
]
, A =
[−M−1D −M−1L
I O
]
,
x(0) =
[
M−1u
0
]
,
whose solution is
x(t) = exp(tA)x(0). (9)
Henceforth the maximum RoCoF metric will be used to
characterise frequency violations: the average metric may be
applied in a similar manner but we reserve this for future
work. The set of disturbances u which do not induce RoCoF
violations will again be referred to as the ‘safe region’.
As confirmed by Fig. 1(b), and in contrast to the system
frequency models of Section III, for a fixed node j the
maximum RoCoF ω˙j does not in general occur at time
0. Let us therefore consider sampling ω˙j at times nN ,
n = 0, . . . , N . Although in principle this involves no loss of
generality since digital RoCoF measurements have a discrete
sampling rate, we note that any lower sampling rate N/
should be chosen carefully to avoid an excessive loss of
sensitivity (a sensitivity analysis for N is provided in the
case study of Section VI). Define the ‘node-j safe region’
K(j,N) by
K(j,N) =
N⋂
n=0
K(j,N)n , where (10)
K(j,N)n =
{
u ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣ω˙j ( n
N

)∣∣∣ ≤ rmax} . (11)
It follows from (9) that K(j,N)n is given by the convex
polytope
K(j,N)n =
{
u ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣∣exp(n N A)j
[
M−1u
0
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ rmax} ,
where exp(tA)j denotes the j-th row of the matrix exp(tA).
Hence K(j,N) and the ‘all-nodes safe region’ K(N) are also
convex polytopes, where
K(N) =
⋂
j∈G
K(j,N). (12)
(Note that, clearly, different thresholds rmax could be chosen
per node to enable modelling of differing protection relay
settings for differing types of generating machine, or to
enable to modelling of DC links, and the safe region would
again be a convex polytope).
Having characterised the safe region, we now turn to
the problem of generating a representative sample from
its complement. In the next section we describe how the
Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm, a commonly used
technique for generating random samples, may be efficiently
adapted for this purpose.
V. GHOST SAMPLING
Recalling from (4) that the entries uj of the random
disturbance u are modelled as continuous random variables
with a joint probability density function pi, the goal in this
section is to sample efficiently from the conditional joint
density, or target,
pi(u)1Kc(u)
pi(Kc)
, where pi(Kc) =
∫
Kc
pi(v)dv.
Since MCMC sampling methods do not require strong
assumptions on the target density they are ideally suited
to such problems [BGJM11], [Tie94]. However the event
Kc is in principle rare, which may cause problems of
computational inefficiency. Below we describe the ghost
sampler, a particular Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm
designed to be efficient in this context.
The ghost sampler is defined in Section V-A, and in
Section V-B it is shown that the generated samples may be
used to approximate statistics of the corresponding target
distribution. We will show in the case study of Section
VI that this enables important statistical questions to be
addressed such as “which generator is most likely to be
disconnected due to a RoCoF violation?” or “what is the
probability of two simultaneous RoCoF violations being
caused, given that a violation occurs?”.
A. Ghost sampling algorithm
Ghost sampling lies in the class of Metropolis-Hastings
algorithms [RR04], [Tie94]. That is, beginning at X0 ∈
Rn, for every i = 1, 2, . . . we generate a proposal Yi+1
distributed according to a density q(Xi, y)dy, and evaluate
the acceptance probability
α(Xi, Yi+1) = min
(
1,
pi(Yi+1)1Kc(Yi+1)q(Yi+1, Xi)
pi(Xi)1Kc(Xi)q(Xi, Yi+1)
)
, (13)
which is interpreted as one if pi(Xi)1Kc(Xi)q(Xi, Yi+1) =
0. With probability α(Xi, Yi+1) the proposal is accepted and
we set Xi+1 = Yi+1, otherwise it is rejected and Xi+1 = Xi.
The aim is to generate a Markov chain X1, X2 . . . with
stationary distribution equal to pi1Kcpi(Kc) which satisfies the
law of large numbers (LLN), meaning that sample averages
1
n
∑n
i=1 f(Xi) for large n provide good estimates for the
actual conditional expectations∫
Kc
f(v)pi(v)dv
pi(Kc)
= Epi[f(X)|X /∈ K].
Commonly there is an underlying symmetric density
q : Rn → R (that is, with q(x) = q(−x)) and the proposal
density used in MH algorithm is q(x, y) = q(|y − x|)
where we abuse notation slightly by denoting both with q.
In this case the algorithm is called Symmetric Random Walk
Metropolis (SRWM), q(x, y) = q(y, x) holds and the q terms
in (13) cancel out. Typical examples are Yi+1 ∼ N(x, σ2In)
or Yi+1 ∼ XI + U([−δ, δ]d), that is, the proposal is drawn
from a normal (resp. uniform) distribution centred at Xi.
Note from (13) that knowledge of pi1Kc suffices and the
normalising constant pi(Kc) need not be known.
A well-known difficulty with the MH algorithm arises
when the target density is multi-modal (see Section 1.11.2 in
[BGJM11]). In the present application to rare event sampling,
where the “common” events are removed from pi, we may be
left with a target density pi1Kcpi(Kc) with multiple, well-separated
local modes. The difficulty arises since a large proportion of
the proposals Xi will lie in K and thus be rejected (since
then α(Xi, Yi+1) = 0), rendering the method inefficient.
The ghost proposal is designed to circumvent these issues
by moving ‘through’ K, and is now described in the case
when K is a bounded convex polytope (clearly K should
also have nonzero volume).
Fix an SRWM algorithm with proposal density q and
target pi1Kcpi(Kc) . Denote the boundary of K by δK, and let
the current state of the chain be Xi /∈ K. First, generate
a SRWM proposal Yi+1 and denote ϕi :=
Yi+1−Xi
|Yi+1−Xi| .
Then with probability 1 we have Yi+1 6= Xi and the ray
from Xi passing through Yi+1 intersects δK either twice
(cf. Fig. 2(b)-(c)) or not at all (cf. Fig. 2(a)). If there are
two numbers t2 > t1 > 0 such that Xi + tϕi ∈ δK, modify
the proposal to Zi+1 = Yi+1 + (t2 − t1)ϕ (cf. Fig. 2(d)).
If there are no such points, set Zi+1 = Yi+1 (cf. Fig. 2(a)).
Finally perform a MH step, accepting the proposal Zi+1 with
probability α(Xi, Zi+1) given by (13) and setting Xi+1 =
Zi+1, otherwise rejecting the proposal and setting Xi+1 =
Xi. This procedure is depicted in Fig. 2 and pseudocode is
provided in Algorithm 1.
The following example illustrates how ghost sampling
improves upon the standard MH algorithm in the present
context. Set K = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : |x| + |y| < 7}, let pi be
the two-dimensional Gaussian density with zero mean and
covariance matrix diag(4, 1) and let q be the density of a
standard two-dimensional Gaussian random variable.
A MH chain starting to the left of the diamond-shaped
set K (cf. Fig. 3) will have difficulties crossing to the right
side of the diamond, since a direct move to the other side is
unlikely and any sequence of steps towards the right side is
likely to suffer rejections because the values of pi are much
smaller around the top and bottom vertices of K then around
the left and right vertices. The ghost sampler, however, is
likely to make a direct move between the left and right sides.
This can be seen in Fig. 3, where scatter plots are given of
values taken by the standard MH chain (in red) and the ghost
sampler (blue). In this way the ghost sampler is designed to
more efficiently explore the rare event Kc.
Xi
Zi+1 = Yi+1
Zi+1
(a)
Xi
Yi+1
Xi+1
Yi+1 = Xi+1
(b)
Xi
Yi+1
Xi+1
Yi+1 = Xi+1
Xi + t1ϕ
Xi + t2ϕ
(c)
Xi
Yi+1
Zi+1
Yi+1 = Zi+1
(d)
Fig. 2: Illustration of the key ideas underlying the ghost
sampling method.
Algorithm 1: Ghost sampler (i-th step)
input : Xi ∈ Kc
1 Generate SRWM proposal Yi+1;
2 Calculate direction ϕi =
Yi+1−Xi
|Yi+1−Xi| ;
3 Calculate all points T := {t > 0 : Xi + tϕ ∈ δK};
4 if T = {t1, t2} then
5 Zi+1 = Yi+1 + (t2 − t1)ϕ;
6 else
7 Zi+1 = Yi+1;
8 end
9 Generate a uniform random variable U on [0, 1];
10 if U ≤ α(Xi, Zi+1) then
11 Xi+1 = Zi+1;
12 else
13 Xi+1 = Xi;
14 end
15 return Xi+1
Fig. 3: Example values taken by the ghost sampler (blue)
and standard MH chain (red).
B. Ghost sampler properties
We now state necessary mathematical properties of the
ghost proposal in a more general setting, which are proved
in the Appendix. More precisely, we assume only that K is
closed and ray-bounded (see Definition 2).
For a starting point x ∈ Kc, a direction ϕ lying in the unit
sphere Sn−1 and a distance r > 0, denote the total length
between x and x+ rϕ that lies outside K by
lϕx (r) :=
∫ r
0
1Kc(x+ tϕ)dt. (14)
Also denote the mapping TKx : Rn → Rn by
TKx (x+ rϕ) := x+ l
ϕ
x (r)ϕ (15)
and a modified proposal density termed the ghost density as
qK(x, x+ rϕ) := q(l
ϕ
x (r)ϕ)
(
lϕx (r)
r
)n−1
1Kc(x+ rϕ),
(16)
where lϕx (r)/r is interpreted as 1 if r = 0.
Note that for x, y ∈ Kc we have qK(x, y) = qK(y, x),
since
l
y−x
|y−x|
x (|y − x|) = l
x−y
|x−y|
y (|x− y|).
Intuitively the map TKx contracts each ray emanating from x
by removing its intersection with K. It is the reverse of the
ghost sampling modification, in the sense that TKXi(Zi+1) =
Yi+1.
Lemma 1. If K is a closed set and x ∈ Kc, then the map
TKx : K
c → Rn is injective.
Definition 2. A closed set K is said to be ray-bounded if
the map TKx : K
c → Rn is surjective for all x ∈ Kc.
In the context of convex polytopes ray boundedness simply
means that any ray starting outside K and intersecting it will
also exit it. For instance, the set {(x, y) ∈ R2 : |x| < 1} ⊂
R2 is ray-bounded but not bounded.
For each x ∈ Kc and measurable set A ⊂ Rn we define
Q(x,A) :=
∫
Rn
q(x, y)1A(y) dy,
QK(x,A) :=
∫
Rn
qK(x, y)1A(y) dy.
The following lemma shows that in the case of ray-
bounded polytope procedure described in Section V-A indeed
results in the ghost density defined in (16).
Lemma 3. For every x ∈ Kc and every measurable set
A ⊂ Rn we have
QK(x,A) = Q(x, T
K
x (A ∩Kc)).
Whenever x ∈ Kc and K is ray-bounded, Lemma 3 gives
that QK(x,Kc) = Q(x, TKx (K
c)) = Q(x,Rn) = 1, which
means that QK is a Markov kernel on Kc. It then follows
from [Tie94, Section 2.3.1] that the measure with density
pi1Kc
pi(Kc) is the unique stationary probability measure of the
MH algorithm with the ghost proposal density qK .
To complete the justification of ghost sampling, we are
also able to show the LLN:
Theorem 4. Let K be closed and ray-bounded. Let
X1, X2, . . . be a Markov chain generated by the ghost
proposal qK derived from a SRWM proposal with density
q which is strictly positive on Rn. Then the strong law of
large numbers holds, that is, for every pi-integrable function
f we have:
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(Xi)
n→∞−−−−→
a.s.
Epi[f(X)|X /∈ K].
VI. CASE STUDY: IEEE 39 NEW ENGLAND NETWORK
In this section we illustrate how the ghost sampler enables
inference about RoCoF violations. As a case study we con-
sider the IEEE 39-bus New England interconnection system,
which has 10 generators and 29 load nodes, see Fig. 4(a).
The system parameters for our experiments are taken from
the Matpower Simulation Package [ZMST11].
We consider the Kron-reduced version of the aforemen-
tioned system, which is illustrated in Fig. 4(b). The thickness
of the edges in Fig. 4(b) is proportional to the equivalent
susceptance between the two corresponding generator nodes.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4: (a) Line diagram of the IEEE 39-bus system and (b)
the Kron-reduced version of the IEEE 39-bus system with
only the 10 generator nodes.
The ghost sampler is capable of sampling from any
continuous distribution one may want to consider for the
power disturbances, in particular those featuring heavy-tailed
or correlated components. Aiming to illustrate its potential,
we thus consider a mixed distribution that prescribes the
disturbances u1 and u2 in generators 1 and 2 to be correlated
and heavy-tailed, while the remaining generators are assumed
to have i.i.d. Gaussian disturbances.
More specifically, we model the disturbances u3, . . . , u10
as independent Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and standard deviations of the size 1/65 times the nominal
power injections of the associated generators, while the
disturbances u1 and u2 are modelled by a correlated heavy-
tailed density
(u1, u2) ∼ 1
1 + (30(u1 − u2/2))4 ·
1
1 + (30(u2 − u1/2))4 .
RoCoF violations are characterised using the maximum
RoCoF metric with threshold rmax = 1Hz/s, which corre-
sponds to the safe region K(N) introduced in the previous
section, see (12). The duration considered is  = 0.5s and
the sensitivity of the results is examined with respect to
N , taking N = 1, 5, 20, 50, 100. The ghost sampler uses
a Gaussian proposal N(0, σ2I), whose standard deviation
σ2 = 10−3 has been tuned so that approximately 15% of the
proposed moves are accepted, as suggested in [NRY12].
For each value of N , 106 disturbances u from the comple-
ment of K(N) were sampled after discarding an initial burn-
in period. For each generator, Table I reports its probability
of disconnection due to a nodal RoCoF violation. Note that
generator 10 was never disconnected in our experiments and
so is not shown.
N G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9
1 28.9 80.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.6 6.5 1.6
5 27.6 81.5 12.4 1.1 2.1 0 1.2 9.8 1.7
20 27.5 79.5 11.5 1.9 3.0 0.1 2.4 15.5 2.0
50 28.5 78.8 12.2 1.1 2.7 0.1 2.4 17.1 2.6
100 28.6 79.8 12.2 1.7 2.4 0.1 1.9 15.6 2.0
TABLE I: Conditional probabilities (in %) of nodal RoCoF
violations at each generator, given that a RoCoF violation
occurs. Results are shown for different time discretizations
N of the interval [0, 0.5s].
Despite noise due to random sampling, the estimates in Ta-
ble I are consistent for N > 5. Recalling (9), the appropriate
choice of N is also informed by the spectral properties of
the matrix A. In particular, the highest frequency component
of the fluctuations is the eigenfunction corresponding to the
eigenvalue with largest imaginary part. Table II reports some
other relevant statistics for the IEEE 39-bus system under
the considered disturbance model, namely the probability
pd of multiple RoCoF violations, the average number d of
violations, and the corresponding average level L of lost
generation.
N = 1 N = 5 N = 20 N = 50 N = 100
pd 15.2% 22.4% 24.0% 25.0% 25.0%
d 1.21 1.37 1.44 1.46 1.44
L 596 701 735 744 736
TABLE II: Some statistics for the IEEE 39-bus system: the
probability pd of disconnecting more than one generator, the
average number d of disconnected generators and the average
amount L of lost load (in MW).
Our case study results highlight the importance of mod-
elling the desynchronization in nodal frequency. It is clear
from Table I that the majority of RoCoF violations occur
at generator 2, which has a heavy-tailed disturbance model.
From Fig. 4, generator 2 is connected via a relatively
high susceptance line to generator 3, which has a Gaussian
disturbance model. Thus RoCoF violations due to a large
disturbance at the former generator are capable of inducing
subsequent violations at the latter within our considered
timescale. This network effect is clearly visible in Fig. 1,
where a large initial disturbance at generator 2 is followed
by a subsequent RoCoF violation, at around t = 0.4s, at
generator 3. The same relationship can be seen between gen-
erators 1 and 8. These observations highlight the importance
of the (reduced) network structure and line susceptances in
the modelling of frequency violation patterns and system
vulnerabilities.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work aims to provide the mathematical framework
to understand how unusually large power disturbances cause
frequency violations, in particular in terms of RoCoF. We
describe the time evolution of the nodal frequencies as a
system of coupled swing equations with a random step
disturbance at time 0. A novel MCMC method is introduced,
called the ghost sampler, to sample disturbances condition-
ally on a RoCoF violation occurring, i.e., outside the so-
called “safe region”. An illustrative case study is presented,
and it would be of interest to develop this further, for example
using empirical probability distributions for heavy-tailed and
correlated renewable forecast errors.
Future work will explore further metrics capturing fre-
quency violations, such as the nadir. It would be natural to
look also at line overloads caused by power fluctuations and
complement in this way the work done in [OM17]. Lastly, we
believe that the MCMC ghost sampler has potentially wide
applicability beyond power systems reliability in settings
where one has to sample rare events. This is particularly
so in view of the fact that many of the conditions for the
region K can be relaxed.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: For any r > 0 and ϕ ∈ Sn−1 we have
lϕx (r) > 0 since K
c is an open set, hence x is the only point
that maps to x. Then let TKx (x + r1ϕ1) = T
K
x (x + r2ϕ2)
for some r1, r2 > 0 and ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Sn−1. This implies x +
lϕ1x (r1)ϕ1 = x + l
ϕ2
x (r2)ϕ2, so that ϕ1 = ϕ2 = ϕ say, and
0 = lϕx (r1)− lϕx (r2) =
∫ r1
r2
1Kc(x+ tϕ)dt must hold, which
is only possible if r1 = r2 (again since the set Kc is open).
2
Proof of Lemma 2: Denote with S the surface of Sn−1.
Changing (16) to polar coordinates and then using the
substitution u := lϕx (r) (with du = 1Kc(x + rϕ)dr), we
have:
QK(x,A) =
∫
Rn
qK(x, y)1A(y)dy
=
1
S
∫
Sn−1
(∫ ∞
0
qK(x, x+ rϕ)1A(x+ rϕ)r
n−1dr
)
dϕ
=
1
S
∫
Sn−1
∫ ∞
0
q(lϕx (r)ϕ)(l
ϕ
x (r))
n−11A∩Kc(x+ rϕ)drdϕ
=
1
S
∫
Sn−1
(∫ ∞
0
q(uϕ)un−11TKx (A∩Kc)(x+ uϕ)du
)
dϕ
=
∫
Rn
q(x, y)1TKx (A∩Kc)(y)dy = Q(x, T
K
x (A ∩Kc)). 2
Definition 5. A Markov kernel P on a space S is ν-
irreducible with respect to a measure ν (on S) if for every
x ∈ S and every measurable A ⊂ S with ν(A) > 0 there
exists an n ∈ N such that Pn(x,A) > 0.
For the approximation of pi integrable functions using our
MH procedure, a sufficient condition to establish the LLN
is the pi1K-irreducibility of QK on Kc (see, for example
[Tie94, Corollary 2] and [MT09, Theorem 17.1.7]). Hence,
to establish Theorem 4 it is enough to show the following:
Theorem 6. Let K be closed and ray-bounded. If the
underlying proposal density q is strictly positive then the
ghost sampling kernel QK is pi1K-irreducible.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary x ∈ Kc and measurable A ⊂ Rn
such that pi1KC (A) = pi(A ∩ Kc) > 0. Define B = A ∩
Kc ∩ {x ∈ Rn;pi(x) > 0}. Clearly pi(B) > 0.
Because Kc is open we have lϕx (r) > 0 for all r > 0 and
all ϕ ∈ Sn−1. By equation (16) qK is strictly positive on Kc.
Since B must have positive Lebesgue measure we then have
QK(x,B) > 0 which implies QK(x,A) ≥ QK(x,B) > 0,
so we may take n = 1 in Definition 5.
